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I. INTRODUCTION
Many professionals have called it the largest financial scandal of all
time, "the banking industry's tobacco moment."' The ongoing investiga-
tions into the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate
("LIBOR"),2 used in a variety of financial instruments, ranging from
retail loans to derivative swap agreements, have proven that substantial
regulatory reform of financial markets is globally in order. Michel
Barnier, European Commissioner responsible for internal markets and
services, rightly noted in a speech to the European Parliament that "[w]e
have to get rid of this 'everything is allowed, everything is permitted'
attitude." 3 In particular, Barnier noted that self-regulation is no longer a
viable option. Additionally, United States Chairman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Gary Gensler has stated that as a result of
banks' shift away from lending unsecured funds to each other, he
"believe[s] that continuing to reference such rates diminishes market
* Member, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami
School of Law; B.S. 2010, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Professor Caroline
Bradley for her feedback and guidance.
1. The LIBOR Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, THE ECONOMIST, July 7, 2012, http://
www.economist.com/node/21558281 ("'This is the banking industry's tobacco moment,' says the
chief executive of a multinational bank, referring to the lawsuits that cost America's tobacco
industry more that $200 billion in 1998. 'It's that big,' he says.").
2. See discussion infra Part. II.
3. Martin Banks, EU Commissioner Michel Barnier Has Called for "Strong and Robust"
Measures to Combat Market Manipulation Such as the Rigging of Benchmark Interest Rate Libor,
THE PARLAMENT, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.theparliament.com/latestnews/article/newsarticle/
barnier-calls-for-strong-and-robust-response-to-liborscandal/#.URgN8KWmDdk.
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integrity and is unsustainable in the long run."4
The LIBOR benchmark was developed to represent the rate at
which banks could realistically borrow funds in the interbank market
prior to 11:00 a.m. on a given day.' The setting of the LIBOR rate
largely relied on the integrity and truthfulness of contributing bank sub-
mitters that the rate submitted was the true rate at which that bank could
borrow on that particular day. However, as a result of greed and lack of
oversight and controls, submitters and traders at various banks were
able to manipulate rates in accordance with their individual goals. The
LIBOR benchmark was no longer representative of actual borrowing
costs: it was a fictional rate negotiated between banks' traders for their
benefit.
After the commencement of investigations concerning manipula-
tion of the LIBOR benchmark, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked
Martin Wheatley, Managing Director of the Financial Services Author-
ity ("FSA") and Chief Executive of the UK's Financial Conduct Author-
ity, to consider whether the findings of manipulation and false
submissions call for a wider policy response. Wheatley proposed a ten-
point plan centered on three main conclusions for the reform of LIBOR
and the restoration of its credibility.6
This Article discusses Wheatley's suggested reforms and analyzes
their viability. Part II provides a detailed background on LIBOR and
how it was calculated before any reform to the benchmark. Part III
details how the manipulation of LIBOR rates occurred and the various
banks that have acknowledged involvement. Part IV provides a detailed
analysis of what financial regulation is and why it is essential for a
benchmark, such as LIBOR. Part V gives a detailed description of
Wheatley's recommendations and reasoning. Lastly, Part VI discusses
the implications of Wheatley's final report and challenges the viability
of the proposed recommendations and regulatory system. In particular,
Part VI challenges Wheatley's (A) reluctance to explore the possibilities
of replacing LIBOR with a different, more structured benchmark that
elicits contributing banks' commitment to their submitted rates; (B) fac-
tors allowing adjustment of actual transaction data in the calculation of
LIBOR in various instances; and finally, (C) allowance of market par-
4. Kevin McCoy, Gensler: Libor Isn't Useful for Setting Rates, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/02/28/gensler-criticizes-libor-systenI9534
41/.system/1953441/.
5. Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/historical-perspec
tive (last visited May 19, 2013).
6. For a detailed discussion on Martin Wheatley's Report see infra Part V; see also MARTN'
wHEATLEY, THE WHEATLEY REviEW OF LIBOR: FDiAL REPORT 40 (Sept. 2012), available at
http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley-review_1ibor-finalreport_280912.pdf.
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ticipants' and submitters' use of discretion in the submitting and calcula-
tions of LIBOR. Although Wheatley's proposed changes to the structure
and governance of LIBOR may be a step in the right direction, this Arti-
cle explores the possibility of the necessity for stricter regulation or
replacement.
II. WHAT Is LIBOR?
During the early 1980s, London, England, possessed a thriving
financial market, which consisted of active trading of newly emerging
financial instruments known as derivative contracts and syndicated
loans.' Each contract contained its own provisions with respect to calcu-
lating the underlying rate. Because of this lack of uniformity of proce-
dure for establishing these rates, the British Banker's Association
("BBA")8 was asked to devise a benchmark that would act as a reference
rate for derivatives and other financial transactions.' Subsequently, the
BBA, working with the Bank of England and other entities, invented the
BBA standard for Interest Settlement Rates, which in turn eventually led
to the publication of the first BBALIBOR (London Interbank Offered
Rate) in January 1986.1o LIBOR rates were originally published solely
for three currencies: U.S. Dollars, Japanese Yen, and British Pound."
The BBA defines LIBOR as "[t]he rate at which an individual con-
tributor panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for
and then accepting interbank offers in reasonable market size, just prior
to [11:00 a.m.] London time."' 2 The BBA further specifies that "[t]he
rate at which each bank submits must be formed from that bank's per-
ception of its cost of unsecured funds in the London interbank market"
and "must represent rates at which a bank would be offered funds in the
7. Historical Perspective, supra note 5.
8. Disclaimer, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/disclaimer/bbalibor-explained/historical-
perspective (last visited May 19, 2013) ("The Government has recommended the regulation of
activities related to LIBOR and a new set of institutions to administer and oversee LIBOR. The
Hogg Committee has been set up to oversee a process to recommend these new institutions. For an
interim period until a new administrator has been identified and a successful transition has been
completed, the BBA has been asked to continue to support the ongoing collection, calculation and
distribution of LIBOR rates. . . . Please note that all information contained within the previous
website shall from 2 April 2013 be considered to be for historic reference purposes only.").
9. See Historical Perspective, supra note 5 ("Rather than negotiating the underlying rate or
forming rates by taking averages of ad-hoc panels, banks could now use a standard rate.").
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Up until 1998, the LIBOR rate was based on the rates at which banks thought that
interbank deposits would be offered by one prime bank to another prime bank for a reasonable
market size in that day at 11 a.m. Definitions, BBALIBOR, www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/
definitions (last visited Feb. 09, 2013). .
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London interbank market."1 3
Every working morning at approximately 11:00 a.m. London Time,
the panel of banks informed Thomson Reuters of the rates at which they
could borrow funds in the market for each specific currency and matu-
rity.14 Subsequently, the highest one-fourth and lowest one-fourth rates
were eliminated, and an average was calculated from the resulting rates,
which in turn produced the official LIBOR rate for the day.1" Once the
LIBOR rate was calculated, individual submissions of panel banks were
made public. According to the BBA, the publication of individual sub-
missions promoted transparency and reliability. 16
It is important to note that the BBA has stated it would not be
"feasible to create a full suite of LIBOR rates" if it were necessary that
all reported rates be based on actual transactions because "not all banks
will require funds in a marketable size each day in each of the curren-
cies/maturities they quote."" Furthermore, the BBA has stated that "a
bank will know what its credit and liquidity risk profile is from rates at
which it has dealt and can construct a curve to predict accurately the
correct rate for currencies or maturities in which it has not been
active."'" However, this may precisely be the practice that allowed for
the escalation of LIBOR-rate manipulation.
LIBOR, since its inception in 1986, has been the most widely used
benchmark in financial markets around the world." LEBOR has been
used as a reference rate in mortgages, student loans, and credit cards.2 0
Additionally, it is the primary benchmark used in most derivative finan-
cial instruments, such as options and swap agreements.2 1 In particular,
contracts with an outstanding value of $300 trillion reference the LIBOR
benchmark. Furthermore, it is used as an indicator of strain in money
13. Id.
14. See The Basics, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/the-basics (last visited
Mar. 23, 2014).
15. Yovonne Diaz, Thomson Reuters Role in the Calculation and Distribution of Libor,
THOMSON REUTERS, Oct. 5 2012, thomsonreuters.com/content/news ideas/articles/financiallour-
role-in-the-calculation-and-distribution-of-libor ("Thomson Reuters is the official calculation and
distribution agent for LIBOR. This role has been performed under the auspices of the British
Bankers Association since 2005, when Thomson Reuters acquired Telerate, the original
calculation agent since the benchmark's inception in 1986.").
16. Justin Wong, LIBOR Left in Limbo; A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 365,
369 (2009).
17. See The Basics, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. See John Kiff, What is LIBOR?, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, Dec. 2012, https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm; see also Mike
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markets and future central bank interest rates.22 LIBOR produced 150
rates per day using ten currencies with fifteen maturities quoted for
each.2 3 Contributor banks were selected based on their scale of market
activity, credit rating, and perceived expertise in the currency con-
cerned.24 However, the market of contributing banks is significantly
small, which could either be beneficial or detrimental to such a market.
For example, a small market should mean that one bank knows the prac-
tices and procedures of the other bank; however, it is this exact tight
community that may allow for collusion and agreement between traders
to manipulate rates for the benefit of themselves and other banks.
There is very little data on the volume of actual interbank transac-
tions that serve as the basis of panel banks' contributing rates. 25 There is
no mechanism through which contributing banks are required to report
the transactions or data on which they base their rate submissions. As a
former trader stated, "[N]o one really knows what's going on in the mar-
ket . . . [y]ou have this vast overhang of financial instruments that hang
their own fixes of a rate that doesn't actually exist.""
Although a benchmark-lending rate, such as LIBOR, is necessary, a
manipulated and loosely governed interbank lending rate may be detri-
mental to financial markets rather than provide stability. In normal mar-
ket conditions, where there is relatively high liquidity in financial
markets, the LIBOR benchmark is directly correlated with Treasury bill
rates, which are low risk and highly liquid.27 However, when financial
markets experience stress, the correlation disintegrates, and there is no
other market-based benchmark that reflects the actual costs of interbank
short-term lending. 28 It is during times of financial stress that manipula-
tion is most likely to occur due to the submitting banks' fear of develop-
ing a reputation as unstable or having low liquidity in the event that a




25. WHEATLEY, supra note 6.
26. The LIBOR Scandal, supra note 1.
27. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and
Reliable Index of Interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial
Discussion Paper, at 4 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2142878.
28. Id. ("During a crisis, a flight to quality may drive down the yields on 'risk-free'
instruments like Treasury-bills at precisely the same time that the liquidity and credit premium
demanded by interbank lenders are likely to rise. Additionally during those times the market
segmentation between short term borrowing and lending to which the LIBOR pertains, and longer
tenor borrowing and lending as typically represented in corporate bonds and credit default swaps,
is likely to increase.").
29. "As far back as March 2008, the Bank for International Settlements concluded that during
period of severe market volatility, LIBOR fixings are less representative of banks' cost of
2014] 887
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ever, the problem may be bigger than possible manipulation solely dur-
ing times of financial stress. Traders in the interbank loan industry have
suggested that LIBOR rates were being manipulated as far back as fif-
teen years ago.3 0 Additionally, Barclays' traders and submitters manipu-
lated the bank's LIBOR submission as far back as 2005, when financial
markets were not experiencing stress.3 ' Therefore, it is questionable
whether the added elements of regulation proposed by the Wheatley
Report will indeed combat and identify any such attempts at manipula-
tion of the LIBOR rate.
III. WHAT HAPPENED?
In 2008, criticisms arose regarding the manipulation and possible
fixing of LIBOR. In particular, it was evident that the interbank lending
market was not functioning properly, as banks were "wary of lending to
each other," and their risk exposure was increasing, but the LIBOR rate
was not increasing to reflect these market changes. 3 2 Additionally, suspi-
cions surfaced concerning bank managers ordering submittal of lower
rates out of fear that a higher rate would act as a symbol of illiquidity
and financial weakness.3 3 In response to these suspicions, the BBA
undertook a review of actual data and the reliability of the LIBOR rate.34
The review elicited concerns that the publication of individual contribut-
ing bank submissions could lead to herd behavior-"where banks are
reluctant to report rates higher than their peers for fear of appearing in
financial distress."3 ' Despite such concerns, the BBA failed to take any
action in implementing a system where the identities of submitting panel
banks remained undisclosed. In April 2008, the BBA announced that it
would block any panel bank that had manipulated data, but it failed to
recognize that manipulation was a reality, which was indeed occurring
in the submissions of panel banks.36
Specifically, the BBA considered opinions regarding unverified
borrowing. Moreover, they found that there can be a significant dispersion in submitted rates due
to heightened uncertainty about credit quality and greater incentives to engage in 'strategic
behavior' or manipulation." Jun Anthony Garcia, 'Fixing the benchmark'; Wheatley Considers
LIBOR Overhaul, FINANCIAL REGULATION INT'L (Sept. 2012), http:H/ssrn.com/abstract=2143137.
30. The LIBOR Scandal, supra note 1.
31. Agreement Appendix A, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section &
Barclays, at 4, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9312012710173426365941
.pdf.
32. Gavin Finch & Ben Livesey, Libor Cracks Widen as Bankers Struggle with Reforms
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2008, 6:53 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&refer--home&sid=amURZMCR-wkI.
33. Wong, supra note 16, at 366.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 373.
36. See id. at 372.
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transparency, creation of an additional U.S. Dollar Benchmark, expan-
sion of the LIBOR panels, tightening the definition of "reasonable mar-
ket size," and enhancement of governance and scrutiny." Despite these
considerations, the BBA only agreed to the possible expansion of
LIBOR panels and a mechanism of enhanced governance and scrutiny."
The BBA contended that the LIBOR panels already included the largest
banks in London but agreed to consider adding more contributing panel
banks." The enhanced governance and scrutiny mechanism provided
that the Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee ("FX & MM
Committee"), which was responsible for the functioning and develop-
ment of BBALIBOR, would include two subcommittees comprised of
practitioners from both contributing and non-contributing banks.4 0 In
particular, this mechanism established a process by which the BBA
monitored submissions and analyzed discrepancies between the fluctua-
tion of submitted rates and actual market activity and flagged those
discrepancies for future investigation.4 1 Nonetheless, the scrutiny mech-
anism was majorly flawed: banks were manipulating data in order to fit
into the spread of submissions by other banks, so there would not be a
discrepancy as compared to market activity or any fluctuation in rates.
Because this was an industry-wide practice, the submissions by panel
banks did not contain any major outliers, and thus the scrutiny mecha-
nism in place was unable to detect the manipulation.42
In late June 2012, Barclays Bank PLC43 admitted to misconduct
related to misrepresented submissions of the rate at which it could bor-
row in the interbank lending market." From 2005 through 2009,
Barclays' swap traders proposed rates to Barclays' LIBOR submitters
that would benefit their particular positions.4 5 Subsequently, Barclays'
submitters tendered inaccurate rates in accordance with swap traders'
requests to Thomson Reuters for the calculation of the LIBOR rate. In
37. See id. at 373-79.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 375.
40. FX & MM Con. SECRETARIAT, LIBOR GOVERNANCE AND SCRUTINY (2008), available
at http://www.bbalibor.com/download/4025.
41. Wong, supra note 16, at 377.
42. Id. at 378-79 ("This new Scrutiny Mechanism, thus, may be able to detect a rogue bank
reporting inaccurate data, but it is unlikely to detect multiple banks acting as a herd to report false
data together.").
43. Barclays is a financial services company headquartered in London, England. See
Agreement Appendix A, supra note 31, at 4.
44. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to
Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and
Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/
2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
45. Agreement Appendix A, supra note 31, at 5.
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particular, the traders "either proposed a particular LIBOR ... contribu-
tion for a particular . . . currency, or proposed that the rate submitter
contribute a rate higher, lower, or unchanged for a particular . . . cur-
rency" for the benefit of their positions. 6 The manipulation was not
contained solely within Barclays. Barclays' traders engaged in rate-fix-
ing negotiations with traders at other contributing panel banks and
requested that those traders communicate rates that would be favorable
to both the Barclays' traders and traders at other banks.4 7 These types of
rate-fixing negotiations resulted in "scratch my back, and I will scratch
yours" situations, where traders outside of Barclays would also make
requests to Barclays' traders for certain interest rates to benefit their
positions.
Barclays' management did not stand far behind the traders. While
rate manipulations were occurring between traders, Barclays also
"under-reported its perception of its borrowing costs."4 8 On various
occasions during the crisis period, submitters were instructed by man-
agement to submit false rates, ones that were closer to expected rates of
other contributing panel banks, rather than actual rates at which Barclays
would borrow.4 9 In most instances, the intention behind the managers'
orders was not to alter the fixed LIBOR rate, but rather just the submis-
sion, which in turn would be excluded as being in the upper quartile and
not affect the actual LIBOR rate.5 0 Nevertheless, these "concerns appar-
ently were outweighed by [the managers'] priority for Barclays' submis-
sions to be 'within the pack.' "" The central motive behind these actions
was avoiding negative press coverage and concern over Barclays'
liquidity.5 2 Although during the crisis the interbank loan market was not
properly functional as a result of low liquidity, which may justify Bar-
clays' perception that other banks were also misquoting their rate sub-
missions, what is more troublesome is that even prior to the occurrence
of any crisis, individual traders attempted to influence rates for their own
benefit." It is questionable whether the proposed regulation by Wheat-
ley will prevent similar motives in the future.
Despite the fact that Barclays' misconduct was the first to be publi-
46. Id.
47. Press Release, FSA, Barclays Fined £59.5 Million for Significant Failings in Relation to
LIBOR and Euribor, (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/
pr/2012/070.shtml [hereinafter FSA Press Release, June 27, 2012]; see also Timeline: Libor-
Fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18671255.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. See Agreement Appendix A, supra note 31, at 16.
51. Id.
52. See Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, supra note 47.
53. See The Libor Scandal, supra note 1.
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cized, it is not the only financial institution that engaged in manipula-
tion. For example, UBS has agreed 5 4 to pay a $1.5 billion fine to
regulators in the United Kingdom, United States, and Switzerland in
order to settle LIBOR manipulation charges." Similarly, traders at UBS
contacted traders at other banks and attempted to coordinate submissions
that would benefit their trading positions.56 Additionally, in February
2013, the Royal Bank of Scotland Plc ("RBS") was fined E87.5 million
for breaches of the FSA's requirements relating to LIBOR.5 7 In particu-
lar, the FSA found that at least 219 document requests and an unquan-
tifiable number of oral requests for inappropriate submissions were
made, and "RBS failed to identify and manage the risks of inappropriate
submissions."5 It is important to note that Barclays, UBS, and RBS did
not have any LBOR-related systems and controls in place until Decem-
ber 2009, September 2009, and March 2011, respectively. 9 "U.S.-based
Citigroup, JPMorgan, and Bank of America have said they are cooperat-
ing with investigators' requests for Libor-related records."6 0
Although underreported or manipulated rates may be beneficial for
those invested in similar positions as the traders at the time of the sub-
missions, the lower LIBOR rate has resulted in high losses. For exam-
ple, when the LIBOR rate is artificially low, borrowing costs for many
corporate and retail borrowers are low. However, lenders or those hav-
ing investments with returns contingent upon the LIBOR rate are at a
loss. It is this disparity that causes problems in determining whether par-
ties are on the losing or winning side and the extent of their damages.
Moreover, because the rate was widely manipulated, it is difficult to
estimate what the proper rate should have been. Likewise, it is question-
able how settlements from panel banks involved in the manipulation will
be allocated because for each transaction where one person gained due
54. Press Release, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the UBS Press
Conference (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-
speech-121219.html [hereinafter Press Release, Dec. 19, 2012] (UBS Japan and its parent
company UBS AG have entered into non-prosecution agreements with the Justice Department
regarding manipulation of their submissions to the British Bankers Association for calculation of
LIBOR, agreeing to pay a total of $1.5 billion.).
55. Lindsay Fortado & Greg Farrell, UBS Said to Face $1.6 Billion Libor Penalty This Week,
BLOOMBERG BUSINFSSWEEK, Dec. 16, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-12-16/
ubs-said-to-face- 1-dot-6-billion-libor-penalty-this-week; see also UBS to Pay $1.5 Billion to Settle
Libor Charges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2012.
56. Press Release, Dec. 19, 2012, supra note 54.
57. Press Release, FSA, RBS Fined E87.5 for Significant Failings in Relation to LIBOR (Feb.
6, 2013), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2013/011.shtml.
58. Id.
59. See id.; Press FSA Press Release, June 27, 2012, supra note 47; FSA, Final Notice UBS
AG (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/ubs.pdf.
60. McCoy, supra note 4.
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to a lower or higher rate, the other suffered losses due to the manipula-
tion. Although banks will be liable for their actions in cases where cau-
sation is proven, the proceeds gained from the manipulation by various
persons involved in the day-to-day manipulation will not be recoverable.
IV. PRIVATE SELF-REGULATION vs. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
Financial regulation has been defined as "governmental standards
or commands, backed by coercive sanctions, requiring private persons to
undertake or refrain from specified conduct." 61 Regulation of the opera-
tion and management of financial institutions focuses on oversight of
business operations, risk management, and corporate governance.62
Milton Friedman, 63 an economist who believed in free market eco-
nomics, proposed in his laissez-faire economics theory, that econo-
mies-including financial markets-possess the ability to correct
themselves, provided there is no regulation. The principle underlying
this theory is that man makes rational calculations in striving to maxi-
mize the utility of goods.64 Friedman argued for a free market in which
there is little or no government involvement or regulation, stating that
the world runs on individuals pursuing their separate interests and that
the world's greatest achievements have not come from government
bureaucracies.65 When questioned on whether the capitalist free market
system rewards system manipulation more than it does virtue, Friedman
responded by stating that no man acts solely on virtue.66
However, it is important to note that prior to formal regulatory
frameworks, the viability of financial systems was heavily dependent on
relationships of trust.67 "[A] primary function of financial institutions is
to improve allocation of funds within the economy." 68 Faith in markets
61. Richard Stewart, Regulation and the Crisis of Legalisation in the United States, in LAW
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY: COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL APPROACHES 97, 100
(Terence Daintith ed., 1998).
62. Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation 12 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research,
Paper No. 329, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805018.
63. Milton Friedman A Heavyweight Champ, at Five Foot Two, THE EcoNoMIsT, Nov. 23,
2006, http://www.economist.com/node/8313925?storyjid=8313925 (stating that Milton Friedman
was "the most influential economist of the second half of the 20th century . . . possibly of all of
it.").
64. Paul Krugman, Who Was Milton Friedman?, Feb. 15, 2007, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2007/feb/15/who-was-milton-friedman/ ("[W]hether consumers are deciding
between corn flakes or shredded wheat, or investors are deciding between stocks and bonds, those
decisions are assumed to be based on comparisons of the 'marginal utility,' or the added benefit
the buyer would get from acquiring a small amount of the alternatives available.").
65. Milton Friedman-Greed, YouTUBE (July 14, 2007), http://youtu.be/RWsx1X8PVA.
66. Id.
67. See Colin Mayer, Trust in Financial Markets, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 617 (2008).
68. Id. at 618.
892 [Vol. 68:883
THE WHEATLEY REPORT ON REFORMING LIBOR
facilitates the growth of those markets. "[P]rotection of investors is a
crucial determinant of the development of financial systems."' 9 Trust in
markets results where individuals are willing to look out not only for
their own interests, but also for the interests of others.7 0 In fact, through
dedicating behavior to the interests of others, individuals again essen-
tially act in self-interest-the conventional description of self-interest
having no application-because they anticipate other benefits from act-
ing this way." Thus, it is hard to say that Friedman was operating on a
definition of self-interest that completely excluded the interests of
others.
Absent such trust, Friedman's idea of self-correcting markets and
free economies where individuals act in their own self-interest becomes
flawed. It is questionable whether Friedman or any other economist who
has theorized that the best economic system is that of a free market with
very little or no government regulation would continue to preach these
theories after the 2007-2008 crisis, which has had worldwide instances
of manipulation, such as the LIBOR scandal. The very self-interest-
absent integrity and trust-of those individuals involved in the submis-
sion and setting of the LIBOR rate, which is used in over $300 trillion
worth of investments and contracts, incentivized them to manipulate the
banks' rates and submit rates that were not representative of actual trans-
actions. It is this self-interest that led to unethical practices-practices
that led to gains for submitters and to major losses for those who would
have gained had LIBOR not been manipulated. Free markets with little
or no government involvement should correct themselves and should not
lead to gains for those who have chosen to act without the slightest bit of
ethical and moral motivations. Instead, the lack of regulation over the
market-generated LIBOR and the market actors' ability to control such
an important benchmark have led to nothing but scandalous cheating.
Regulatory bodies are often faced with the decision whether to
enact strategies that require their direct oversight and expenditure or to
delegate the regulatory responsibility to the private sector and allow for
self-regulation.7 2 Generally, extensive financial regulation is enacted
only in response to a crisis, a shift in markets, or any other change that
may lead to financial instability." In normal market conditions, where
69. Id.
70. Id. at 630.
71. Id.
72. Pan, supra note 62, at 5.
73. Charles K. Whitehead, Regulating for the Next Financial Crisis, 37 CORNELL L.F. 20
(2011) ("The decisions in the 1930's to separate commercial and investment banking followed the
onset of the Great Depressions, which result from, among other things, a restrictive monetary
policy and a precipitous decline in stock values after transformative growth in equity markets.").
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there is no indication of instability or crisis, governments and regulators
tend to delegate a majority of their regulatory responsibility to private
market participants. It is not until a major financial crisis occurs that
government involvement in financial regulation becomes a focus. For
example, it was not until the start of the 2007-2008 financial crisis that
governments and regulators began to focus on regulating financial mar-
kets. As a result, the private-public divide in regulation narrowed. How-
ever, it is not certain whether there will be a retraction in regulation once
markets return to normal, thus causing the private-public divide to again
widen.
Even with the increase in cross-border trade and financial transac-
tions, self-regulation was still the most widespread form of regulation.7 4
Prior to World War I and the Great Depression, government regulation
of financial markets was virtually non-existent. A move towards more
regulation can be seen in the fifteen years prior to the 2007-2008 crisis,
such as the development of codes of conduct, and, following Enron, the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Similarly, if those actions by regulators
were insufficient to prevent crisis and scandal, then the proposals made
by the Wheatley Report will be insufficient to combat future manipula-
tion or scandal associated with the setting of the LEBOR rate or any
other benchmark.
It is during times of financial crisis that the use of benchmarks is
most important, as that is when benchmarks diverge from the rate
reflected by treasury notes. However, if the regulations proposed by
Wheatley are weak and allow for self-regulation-particularly in times
of crisis-then they are and will be ineffective in preventing the miscon-
duct that called for more regulation. Thus, the following question arises:
does the lack of regulation or delegation to private actors lead to market
instability or weaker markets in the long term?
Market instability breeds more competition between financial insti-
tutions and market participants. It is at this point that manipulation and
misconduct essentially become a survival mechanism, allowing partici-
pants to inch up or at least not fall off of the totem pole of competition
and lose prominence in the global financial industry. In particular, in a
time of crisis, market regulators are motivated to display control over
market conditions, and therefore, enact various measures to encourage a
74. See Stefano Pagliari, Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the
Regulation of Derivatives, Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds, 18 EUR. L.J. 44, 45 ("The
predominance of private rule-making in the regulation of finance endured and reached its height
during the 'first wave of globalisation.... At this time, both the most important financial centre in
the world (London) and its emerging challenger (New York) maintained powerful self-governing
corporatist institutions, such as the London Stock Exchange, the Corporation of Lloyds, and the
New York Stock Exchange.").
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restored public confidence in the markets; however, this motivation
seems to dissipate once markets return to normal conditions and the pub-
lic's confidence is restored." Intervention of financial regulatory author-
ities is necessary in areas that were previously left solely to private
market participants. Accordingly, there are two issues that must be ana-
lyzed. First, is more government regulation a feasible solution to the
ongoing LIBOR crisis? And second, how effective will the currently
proposed regulation be in preventing future financial market demise and
misconduct by private entities?
Effective financial public regulation depends on the formulation of
effective rules and adequate supervision over the actual compliance
of institutions. Rules must be precise, transparent, and intelligible, and
should inform the regulated persons of the ramifications of noncompli-
ance. 6 Supervision consists of application of existing rules to oversee
the manner in which a regulated entity attempts to comply with the
rules." Regulatory supervision is closely related to enforcement, which
involves prosecution for lack of compliance to the rules set out by the
regulatory body.
V. THE WHEATLEY REPORT
Subsequent to the confirmation of Barclays' involvement in manip-
ulations and misconduct in fixing of the LIBOR rate, the British govern-
ment asked Martin Wheatley, Managing Director of the Financial
Services Authority ("FSA") and Chief Executive-designate of the UK's
Financial Conduct Authority to conduct a review of the LIBOR rate-
setting process and its use." In particular, Wheatley was asked to make
recommendations on how the benchmark could be reformed and its
credibility restored."
In a speech, Wheatley stated, "The system is broken and needs a
complete overhaul . . . [i]t has been torn from the very fabric that our
financial system was built on."s 0 He emphasized the importance
of proper-functioning financial markets that foster the confidence and
75. Pan, supra note 62, at 6 ("In the aftermath of any such financial crisis or scandal,
regulators face intense pressure to demonstrate they are in control of the financial markets and,
therefore rely more on public strategies-strategies that give the regulator greater visibility and
command. . . . Eventually, however, resource constraints force regulators to seek more cost
effective regulatory strategies, driving them to rely more on private strategies.").
76. See id. at 14.
77. See id.
78. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 3.
79. Id.
80. Martin Wheatley, Managing Director, FSA, and CEO Designate, FCA, Speech at
Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Pushing the Reset Button on LIBOR (Sept. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0928-mw.shtml.
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trust of consumers. 8 ' Although Wheatley suggested a "complete over-
haul," he stated that "the current system . . . is not beyond repair,"
and a complete replacement8 2 of the LIBOR benchmark is not neces-
sary.8 Rather, Wheatley focused on restoring LIBOR to what it was
supposed to be-restoring its integrity and ensuring a situation in
which individuals act with integrity through the help of both market
participants and market regulators. 84 Wheatley further emphasized that
"LIBOR is a creation of the market, invented by the market for the mar-
ket," and therefore, "banks and market participants must play their part"
in the restoration of the LIBOR benchmark the way that it was initially
supposed to be.
Wheatley identified various problems and flaws with the current
system.85 Wheatley first identified weaknesses in the LIBOR mecha-
81nism. Second, he pointed to limitations in the current governance
framework." Third, he identified a lack of external accountability.
Accordingly, Wheatley's report sets out a ten-point plan for reforming
the framework of LIBOR and restoring its credibility. Specifically,
Wheatley's report focuses on three broad areas: (1) a regulatory struc-
ture that would include criminal liability; (2) a transfer of governance
from the BBA; and (3) technical changes to LIBOR itself. 9
In particular, Wheatley's plan for a new regulatory structure90
requires that governmental authorities amend the Financial Services and
Markets Act of 2000 ("Act of 2000") to make submitting and adminis-
tering LIBOR a regulated activity.91 In response to Wheatley's plan, the
UK's Financial Services Act of 2012, which amends the Act of 2000,
81. Id.
82. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 7 ("A move to replace LIBOR could only be justified by clear
evidence that the benchmark is severely damaged, and that a transition to a new, suitable
benchmark or benchmarks could be quickly managed to ensure limited disruption to financial
markets... . [A] transition to a new benchmark or benchmarks would pose an unacceptably high
risk of significant instability, and risk large-scale litigation between parties holding contracts that
reference LIBOR. Furthermore, through the course of consultation, it has become clear that,
despite the loss of credibility that LIBOR suffered recently, there has been no noticeable decline
in the use of LIBOR by market participants. Indeed, a clear majority market participants
responding to the Review's consultation argued for the continuation of a form of LIBOR, rather
than its wholesale replacement.").
83. Wheatley, supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 82.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 82-83.
88. See id. at 83.
89. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 8-9.
90. Id. at 12 ("The majority of responses to the discussion paper have been in favour of
making both [the administering and submission of LIBOR] regulated activities.").
91. Id. at 11.
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provides that the setting of benchmarks is a regulated activity and spe-
cifically includes provisions on misleading statements in relation to
benchmarks.9 2 This allows the Financial Conduct Authority 93 ("FCA")
to regulate, through a set of rules, the submission, calculation, and publi-
cation of the LIBOR benchmark. The FCA is responsible for taking
actions against and prosecuting any wrongdoing, including supervising
submitting banks' conduct (both identifying and investigating any suspi-
cious submissions), invoking monetary sanctions, and criminally prose-
cuting for manipulation of LIBOR. Wheatley further suggests that those
individuals involved in "controlled functions"94 related to the rate sub-
mission and administration processes should first be approved by the
FCA, thus ensuring that these individuals are fully aware of their respon-
sibilities in regards to LIBOR submissions or administration.95 Addi-
tionally, Wheatley invites the UK to support the EU in developing
a civil market abuse system and accessible and transparent access
to benchmarks.96 Wheatley acknowledges that this regulatory system
would be more costly for firms and would place a higher burden on
regulatory authorities; however, he believes that any such burdens are
outweighed by the benefits resulting from a more structured regulatory
system.
A lack of or weak institutional governance allowed for the creation
of an obvious opportunity for manipulation. Therefore, Wheatley sug-
gests that a well-structured regulatory scheme and proper governance
and oversight are essential. He suggests that the first step that must be
taken is to replace the BBA as administrator of LIBOR and name a new
administrator," which is to be a private organization, rather than a pub-
92. Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, §§ 7, 91 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted.
93. Id. at § 1A(1) ("The body corporate previously known as the Financial Services Authority
is renamed as the Financial Conduct Authority.").
94. Wheatley identifies senior management-the manager responsible for the submission
process-or the individual submitters as possible options for the controlled function. Wheatley,
supra note 6, at 14.
95. Id. at 13 (Wheatley suggests that the "approved persons regime" will allow the FSA to
ensure that individuals are "fit and proper" to perform the controlled function and ensure that
these individuals comply with the regulations put into place, while holding the power to strip the
individual from his or her role or impose a public censure or monetary penalty.).
96. Id. at 11.
97. On February 26, 2013, the Hogg Tendering Advisory Committee chaired by Baroness
Hogg opened the tendering process to recommend the appointment of a new LIBOR
administrator. See Hogg Tendering Committee for LIBOR, https://www.gov.uk/government/
policy-advisory-groups/hogg-tendering-committee-for-libor. Starting on February 1, 2014, the
Intercontinental Exchange Benchmark Administration took over as the new administrator of
LIBOR, replacing the BBA. See ICE Benchmark Administration to Become New Administrator of
LIBOR on February 1, 2014, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-
20140117-904457.html.
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lic body.98 This new private administrator will be tasked with the
responsibility of overseeing the compilation and distribution of LIBOR,
as well as providing credible internal governance and oversight.9 9 The
new administrator will be tasked with setting up various checkpoints in
the submission and administration of the LIBOR rate, and most impor-
tantly, providing a system that is transparent. Wheatley notes that one of
the most important responsibilities of the administrator will be "scrutiny
of submissions."100 The system put in place to ensure scrutiny should
include both pre- and post-publication verification against verifiable sta-
tistics, other deposit transactions and financial data.o'0 The administrator
would also be responsible for defining submission guidelines that must
be met by panel banks participating in the setting of LIBOR. Further-
more, Wheatley suggests that an independent external oversight commit-
tee should make many of the decisions.102
Lastly, contributing panel banks' submissions of interbank borrow-
ing rates should be subject to a tougher system and more controls.
Wheatley recommends that more transparency is needed. In particular,
actual transactions need to be recorded, firms regularly audited, and
transparency provided as to whether the submitted rate is based on an
actual transaction. 0 3 Wheatley suggests several procedures that should
be put in place: (1) publicizing individual bank LIBOR submissions
after three months to reduce the incentive to manipulate due to a possi-
ble negative stigma; (2) reducing the number of currencies and maturi-
ties for which LIBOR is calculated; and (3) ensuring that a large number
of panel banks participate in the submittal of rates used in the calculation
of LIBOR.'04 Furthermore, Wheatley invites users of LIBOR to consider
the appropriateness of LIBOR for their specific contract and to consider
98. Wheatley explains that LIBOR should remain a "market-led benchmark" and therefore
remain under the governance of a private administrator:
A private organization is likely to have a greater incentive to ensure that the
benchmark is fit for purpose and evolves to meet the changing needs and nature of
the market. In contrast, public ownership would; change the relationship between
the market that created and developed LIBOR, and the future evolution of the
benchmark; reduce the incentive and ability for LIBOR to adapt to the needs of
market participants; and potentially affect the choice of benchmarks by these
participants.
Wheatley, supra note 6, at 22.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 24.
101. Id.
102. This oversight committee should include market participants that use the benchmark, with
all members of the committee having equal standing, and their meeting minutes and details of
their membership should be made available to the public. See id. at 25.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 38 ("[O]nly a small group of banks contribute to the benchmark, and there are some
notable large banks that do not participate in the LIBOR panels.").
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contingency provisions in the event that a LIBOR rate is unavailable. 105
The British Government has fully accepted Wheatley's recommen-
dations. 10 6 In particular, the Government has amended the Financial Ser-
vices Act of 2000 in accordance with Wheatley's recommendations to
make LIBOR a regulated activity, to create a new criminal offense for
any misrepresentations in connection with the submissions or adminis-
tration of benchmarks, and to give the FCA to be headed by Wheatley
the power to develop rules and codes of conduct to be followed by sub-
mitting banks.107 The British Government has reiterated the importance
of a reliable LIBOR benchmark and its view that such manipulations are
intolerable and that those involved should be punished.' Furthermore,
Baroness Hogg led the panel that identified the new administrator to
replace the BBA. Moreover, in accordance with Wheatley's report, the
British Government stated that banks and market participants' role is
essential in the success of the reform proposed by Wheatley and enacted
by the British Government.109
Additionally, the European Commission has conducted an analysis
detailing the possible framework for regulation of the production and
use of indices serving as benchmarks in financial markets and other con-
tracts.110 "The Commission has already moved to amend the proposals
for abuse [r]egulation and the criminal sanctions for market abuse
[d]irective to clarify that any manipulation of benchmarks is clearly and
unequivocally illegal and can be subject to administrative or criminal
sanctions.""' However, the European Commission goes a step further in
recognizing that "[s]anctioning does not remove the risks of manipula-
tion arising from the inherent conflicts of interest linked to the produc-
tion and governance of benchmarks" and is "seek[ing] to assess how to
improve the production and governance of benchmarks."" 2
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE WHEATLEY REPORT
Wheatley reached the following key conclusions that underline his
105. Id. at 7.
106. HM Treasury, Government Accepts Recommendations from the Wheatley Review of
LIBOR in Full, Oct. 17, 2012, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_94_12.htm.
107. Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted.
108. HM Treasury, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. European Commission, Consultation Document on the Regulation of Indices (Sept. 5,
2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/consultations/docs/2012/benchmarks/con
sultation-document-en.pdf (The report focuses on the improvement of governance structures for
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recommendations: (1) LIBOR should be reformed rather than replaced;
(2) transaction data should be used to support LIBOR submissions; and
(3) market participants should continue to play a significant role in the
setting and oversight of LIBOR.' 13 This section discusses whether the
conclusions and changes proposed by Wheatley will prevent the occur-
rence of future manipulation and misconduct by reporting banks and
their submitters and traders. The discussion points out that Wheatley's
recommendations are an initial step in the right direction, but they may
not be sufficient to effectively restore the benchmark and prevent manip-
ulation in the future.
"For a benchmark to be robust and credible it should be based on
actual data collected from diverse sources based on transactions exe-
cuted in a well-regulated and transparent market, supported by appropri-
ate governance and compliance procedures and monitoring."l 4 In
particular, a mechanism of procedures and controls that serve to verify
the accuracy of underlying transaction data of submitted rates must
exist. Additionally, expanding the number of contributing panel banks
and market participants actually participating in the setting and govern-
ance of LIBOR rates will lead to less opportunity for collusion and
manipulation. When a large pool of submitting rates exists even in the
case of collusion between few contributing panel banks, the result on the
LIBOR rate will not be significant. However, this proposition contains a
very important caveat: if, as has occurred in the past, collusion between
banks and manipulation of submissions for profit becomes an industry-
wide phenomenon, it may spread to all contributing panel banks regard-
less of the large pool of participating banks. Establishing a perfect sys-
tem is likely impossible; however, it is the responsibility of authorities
and regulators to cabin all opportunities and incentives for manipulation
of a once credible benchmark that not only the financial market relies
on, but also retail consumers who are unfamiliar with the workings of
financial markets, such as homebuyers and students.
A. Reform vs. Replacing the Benchmark
Wheatley advocates for a comprehensive reform of LIBOR rather
than replacing it. Importantly, Wheatley's report concludes that "[a]
move to replace LIBOR could only be justified by clear evidence that
the benchmark is severely damaged, and that a transition to a new, suita-
ble benchmark or benchmarks could be quickly managed to ensure lim-
113. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 7.




THE WHEATLEY REPORT ON REFORMING LIBOR
ited disruption to financial markets."" Despite the decline in LIBOR's
credibility, there has not been a decline in its use."I Most market par-
ticipants opine that they are reluctant to experience a transition into a
whole new benchmark.' 17 However, Wheatley provides a slight caveat
that his recommendations do not serve as an attempt to "conduct a
detailed evaluation of alternatives that might, over time, come to be used
by market participants." 1 8
Despite Wheatley's reluctance to discuss or consider an alternative
to LIBOR as part of his recommendations, he devotes a whole section in
his report to the consideration of alternative benchmarks should there be
a desire to move away from LIBOR to a new benchmark.' 19 Specifi-
cally, "there are a number of criteria that can be used to determine the
suitability of a particular interest rate as a direct alternative to
LIBOR."' 2 0 The criteria include the following requirements: (1) matur-
ity curves for all given maturities; (2) resilience through times of stress
and liquidity; (3) a liquid underlying market; and (4) transparency and
historical data.121 However, many of the currently existing alternative
benchmarks, such as overnight index rates, may be susceptible to the
same problems experienced by the LIBOR rate. 12 2 Additionally, Wheat-
ley identifies weaknesses in the alternative benchmarks, such as lack of
maturity curves and liquidity.123
Wheatley's recommendations focus largely on amending the gov-
erning structure of LIBOR, but they do not devote much analysis to
amending the components of the calculation of the rate. Although a
completely new alternative benchmark may not be a plausible solution at
the moment, consideration should be given into a possible combination
of already existing rates or a variation in the calculation of panel banks'
submissions. Wheatley fails to consider such alternatives and solely ana-




119. Id. at 46-50.
120. Id. at 46.
121. Id. at 46-47.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 47-50 (Wheatley considers the central bank policy rate (not a rate at which actual
transactions are undertaken other than with the central bank and is based on a relatively short
maturity), overnight index rates and overnight index swaps (by definition do not have a maturity
curve and the market has a lack of liquidity), short-term government debt (involves complex
analysis between moving maturities), certificates of deposits and commercial paper (suffer similar
weakness to those of LIBOR), secured lending rates (do not fully reflect bank credit risk and very
sensitive to credit and liquidity risk of underlying collateral), and a synthetic rate (only as strong
as the components that it consists of and a risk of including unrelated elements exists), but
concludes that no single currently existing rate is likely to be able to serve as a viable replacement
of LIBOR.).
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lyzes already existing rates without any inquiry into a new benchmark
with a low transition risk.
Although Wheatley considers that the LIBOR scandal has not
reached such magnitude to warrant replacement, there are others in favor
of complete replacement. Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, has stated that "[LIBOR] remains vulner-
able to bank misconduct and should be replaced."' 2 4 Additionally, in the
initial brink of the LIBOR scandal, many policymakers opined that a
new benchmark was necessary in order to restore faith in global finan-
cial markets.125
Scholars Abrantes-Metz and Evansl 26 have proposed that CLIBOR,
"committed" LIBOR, may serve as an alternative to the current LIBOR
benchmark. 127 CLIBOR is premised on three important procedures.
First, panel banks involved in the submission of rates for the calculation
of LIBOR will be required to commit to conduct actual transactions
within a submitted bid or ask-quote range. 128 Second, a data-clearing
house will verify the panel banks' commitment to transact at the given
rates and also compile and report aggregate transaction data that will be
made public with a lag on actual identities. Third, a governing body
composed of participating banks, users of the benchmark, and other
independent parties will serve as the administrator of CLIBOR, as well
as be in charge of operating the data-clearing house.
Abrantes-Metz and Evans argue for such a "committed" system
because they maintain that a benchmark based solely on actual transac-
tions is insufficient. During times of financial crisis, the number of
actual transactions carried out by panel banks may change drastically
from one day to the next, market liquidity is likely to be low, and a few
large banks entering or leaving the interbank lending market result in a
highly volatile benchmark based on actual transactions. 2 9 Therefore,
they suggest that the best alternative is to use a benchmark that is not
based on previous actual transactions, but on an index of quotes pro-
124. Gensler Calls for Libor Replacement, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10000872396390444358804578016483824832360.htmi.
125. Saying Goodbye to Libor Won't Be Easy, but It's Necessary, BLOOMBERG, July 23, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/saying-goodbye-to-libor-won-t-be-easy-but-it-s-
necessary.html.
126. Abrantes-Metz & Evans, supra note 27, at 1 (Rosa Abrantes-Metz is an Adjunct Professor
at the Stern School of Business, New York University and a Principal of Global Economics
Group. David S. Evans is Executive Director of the Jevons Institute for Competition Law and
Economics and Visiting Professor at the University College London, Lecturer at the University of
Chicago Law School and Chairman of Global Economics Group.).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1.
129. Id. at 5.
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vided by banks that are ready and will borrow or lend at a rate within the
bid or ask spread. Panel banks that submit artificially low bid or ask
quotes will be locked out of lending or borrowing for that day, unless
they pay a penalty.130 Abrantes-Metz and Evans do not discount the
importance of actual transaction data, as they point out that the bid or
ask quotes submitted by panel banks will then in turn be verified and
analyzed in accordance with existing actual transactions. However, it is
unclear whether a committed LIBOR system would be enough to com-
bat an industry-wide practice of manipulation. For example, if all or
many contributing banks collude with one another in the setting of their
rates to be submitted for calculation, it would be difficult to single out
the banks that are not reporting the manipulated rate. Banks will be
incentivized to submit those rates that will be beneficial to their posi-
tions, as long as such rates do not exceed or underestimate the rate at
which the panel bank is willing to borrow or lend.
In response to Wheatley's concern over a fluid transition from
LIBOR to an alternative benchmark without a major disruption in mar-
kets, Abrantes-Metz and Evans draw a comparison to the transition to
the use of the Euro and state that a transition to CLIBOR can similarly
be achieved."3 ' Abrantes-Metz and Evans concede that the processes of
setting and administering CLIBOR will be more costly than those asso-
ciated with the current LIBOR benchmark but will effectively restore
credibility in the interbank borrowing benchmark and reduce the possi-
bility of future manipulation. 132 It is also important to note that Wheat-
ley's proposed recommendations of more regulation and a better-
equipped and focused administrative body will cost more than the cur-
rent process of LIBOR setting. A comparison of actual costs has not
been made available. Furthermore, there may be concern that panel
banks will be hesitant to accept a committed LIBOR rate. 133 However,
Wheatley similarly notes that contributing banks may be hesitant to par-
ticipate in the newly proposed process for LIBOR and may need to be
compelled by stricter regulations.
Overall, it is questionable whether reform of the current administra-
tion of the LIBOR rate, together with the introduction of more sanctions,
rather than an introduction of a new interbank lending benchmark, will
prove to be sufficient in preventing future manipulation or misrepresen-
tations by contributing banks. The fact that Wheatley concedes that a
new benchmark may be needed in the future should be a red flag to
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id.
133. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Will the Wheatley Recommendations Fix
LIBOR?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., at 7 (Nov. 2012).
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regulators and market participants that a more radical change of LIBOR,
such as a new or completely transformed benchmark, is necessary.
B. Use of Actual Transaction Data
Wheatley's second major conclusion is the necessity of actual
transaction data, which would explicitly and transparently corroborate
panel banks' submissions. 1 34 This does not entail a change in the defini-
tion of LIBOR, but instead calls for the use of other transactions to
ensure correct submittal by contributing panel banks, particularly in
times of limited activity in the interbank exchange market. It is impor-
tant to note that Wheatley recommends that the new administrator
develop a detailed code of conduct that would set out specific guidelines
that all submitting banks must follow. 135
Until specific guidelines are developed, submitters should look to
the submission guidelines proposed in Wheatley's Report.136 These
guidelines include a hierarchy of specific transactions to be used in
determining the LIBOR rate to be submitted by each individual contrib-
uting bank, with the greatest emphasis placed on transactions by the con-
tributing bank. 1 37 Submissions may be adjusted based on various factors,
such as relationship in time between submission and impact of market
events, techniques for interpolation and extrapolation from available
data, changes in credit standing of market participants and the contribut-
ing bank, and non-representative transactions.13 8
Wheatley has concluded that actual information that is capable of
scrutiny should be used by banks upon calculating their rate to be sub-
mitted for inclusion in the calculation of the actual LIBOR rate. 139 How-
ever, Wheatley recognizes that in certain situations, due to a lack of
data, panel banks may either have to take into account third-party trans-
actions or rely on their own expert judgment. 140 This proposition seems
counterintuitive because motivation for manipulation of rate submis-
sions arose at a time when liquidity was low and actual transactions
134. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 27.
135. Id. at 28 (Wheatley proposes the following hierarchy: "(1) contributing banks'
transactions in: the unsecured inter-bank deposit market .. . other unsecured deposit market ...
and other relations markets . .. (2) contributing banks' observations of third party transactions in
the same markets; (3) quotes by third parties offered to contributing banks in the same markets;
and (4) in the absence of transaction data relating to a specific LIBOR benchmark, expert
judgment should be used to determine a submission.").
136. Id. at 8.
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were scarce. Therefore, the requirement that actual data be used will be
useful only during regular economic times.
It is during times of financial stress that the LIBOR rate is the most
useful. During normal economic times where liquidity is high and risk is
normal or low, LIBOR movement is positively correlated with the Trea-
sury Bill rate because banks are able to lend and borrow to and from one
another at normal rates, due to a lack of volatility and high risk.14 ' Dur-
ing a time of financial crisis, interest rates on Treasury bills are likely to
decrease. However, in times of financial stress in the markets, where
liquidity is low and risk is on the rise, banks in the interbank borrowing
market are likely to tighten their criteria for lending and charge a higher
rate, leaving LIBOR as the only benchmark representative of the
interbank borrowing market. Therefore, the difference between LIBOR
and the Treasury Bill rate gets wider as markets' liquidity decreases and
risk increases, signifying the emergence of an economic crisis. 14 2 The
importance of an accurate, manipulation-free benchmark increases in
times of financial stress or economic crisis.
However, according to Wheatley's suggestions, it is exactly during
this time-when actual transactions are not prevalent-that contributing
banks will be allowed to base their submissions on a variety of other
transactions and factors, again providing an opportunity for manipula-
tion. Upon analyzing the publicized facts of the LIBOR scandal, it is
clear that it is during economic downturns that banks and traders are
most incentivized to manipulate the LIBOR rate. In particular, it is dur-
ing economic downturns that bank managers have an incentive to appear
as being one of the stronger, more financially stable financial institutions
in the market, thus also being incentivized to misrepresent the rate at
which they are able to borrow in the interbank market so as not to appear
weak or on the brink of destruction.
Additionally, Wheatley suggests that individual contributing bank
submissions not be made available to the public for three months. 4 3 The
reasoning behind this suggestion is that a delay in publication will essen-
tially rid the submitting banks of a motivation to understate their rate
resulting from the possible risk that if a bank's submitted rate is higher
than others then a stigma that the bank is in trouble will be formed by
the public.'" However, this proposition seems counterintuitive to the
proposition that the LIBOR processes are to be more transparent. Fur-
141. Abrantes-Metz & Evans, supra note 133, at 3.
142. Understanding the TED Spread, ECONOBROWSER, Sept. 28, 2008, http://www.econbrow
ser.com/archives/2008/09/understandingt.html ("The LIBOR term spread must therefore be
interpreted as some sort of a liquidity or risk premium.").
143. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 38.
144. See id. at 37-38.
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thermore, it will become harder for market participants to evaluate the
LIBOR rate's credibility and reliability in real-time markets. This
assessment will have to be based on three-month old data, which may
not at all be representative of the current market environment. A better
solution to such a delay may be that proposed by Abrantes-Metz and
Evans: publishing the submitted rates daily, but not including the iden-
tity of the bank that has submitted the rate. This may prove to be effec-
tive in combating the problem that has resulted from the transparency of
daily publication and identification of the contributing banks' submitted
rate.
Although the recommendation to base all submissions on actual
transactions is a step in the right direction, it is questionable how effec-
tive it will be and for how long it will be effective. It is important to note
here that this was not simply one bank manipulating rates; in fact, it was
an industry-wide practice-it was the norm. Therefore, it is doubtful
that placing guidelines and reforming the regulatory structure of the
LIBOR processes will rid the processes of all unethical practices and
restore the benchmark to its original integrity-based system. Further, it is
also questionable whether the LIBOR benchmark was ever rooted in a
market based on integrity and fair practices. If not, the problem may be
larger than anyone anticipated, and a call for stricter financial regulation
or complete reform of all financial markets in the world may be in order.
Therefore, for purposes of the immediate future, Wheatley's recommen-
dations may be extended and refined to provide a better system for the
management of submission of rates to be used in the calculation of the
LIBOR rate.
C. Market Participants
Wheatley states that it would be inappropriate for regulatory
authorities to take over the whole process of producing a benchmark that
is used by and for the benefit of market participants.14 5 In particular, it
would be unacceptable for authorities to force users of the benchmark to
accept or adopt a particular benchmark that will be used by them.14 6
Wheatley argues that the role of the authorities is solely to ensure the
integrity of the process of setting and administering the benchmark.
Here, Wheatley's reasoning mirrors Milton Friedman's free market the-
ory. He proposes that market participants will gravitate towards the most
reliable and verifiable benchmark for any given transaction. 147 Market
participants' continued support for reform rather than replacement of
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LIBOR evidences their willingness to assume the risk that incentives for
manipulation may still exist.
Furthermore, Wheatley states, "[s]ubmitters should use their expe-
rience of the inter-bank deposit market and its relationship with other
markets to develop their LIBOR submission."l48 Is this not what submit-
ters did when they decided to manipulate their bank's submissions for
calculation into the LIBOR rate? Leaving submitters with a spectrum of
discretion may lead to future manipulation. Allowing the rates to be
based on transactions other than the contributing bank's transactions will
allow submitters great leeway into reasoning why they used a specific
transaction. Incentives for choosing the data that is most favorable to the
particular bank will result in the possibility of collusion. If submissions
are based on the contributing bank's observation of third-party transac-
tions in the market or quotes by third parties offered to the contributing
bank, then what is to prevent collusion between panel banks by agreeing
to quote lower than actual rates, knowing that these quotes will solely be
used for the determination of the LIBOR rate? This gap in reasoning will
result in a gap incentivizing strategies for manipulation in practice.
Market participants' control over LIBOR led to the widespread
practice of misrepresentation and manipulation of submissions. As the
investigation of the LIBOR scandal deepens, it becomes evident that
manipulation of rate submissions was an industry-wide practice by none
other than market participants. Thus, market participants should have
less discretion in the setting of LIBOR and regulating authorities must
have more active involvement in the procedures involved in such
setting.
It is important to note, as Wheatley suggests, that there are issues
that may be best achieved by agreement between both the administrator
and market participants.14 9 It is not disputed that market participants
should have some discretion and ability to recommend various goals or
processes by which the benchmark should be administered; those sug-
gestions should be scrutinized and approved by an active administrator.
It is also important that the oversight committee set up by the new
administrator consist of a diverse group of individuals, including schol-
ars and users of the actual benchmark, so that the committee will have a
range of experience on which to rely. Furthermore, it is important that
such committee members are held to a high ethical standard of conduct
to avoid any future collusions between persons heavily invested in con-
tracts reliant on the LIBOR benchmark or a different benchmark should
a transition be made.
148. Id. at 28.
149. Id. at 30.
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A better alternative to granting market participants discretion may
be a requirement that contributing banks commit to actually use the rates
they submit for the calculation of the LIBOR rate, as suggested by
Abrantes-Metz and Evans.150 Allowing panel banks and market partici-
pants in general to have an active role in the governance of the LIBOR-
setting process in combination with requiring contributing banks to com-
mit to transact in accordance with their submitted rates will force all
market participants to take on the processes associated with LIBOR in a
more serious fashion.
Wheatley suggests that market participants who are currently using
the LIBOR benchmark consider and evaluate their use of the LIBOR
benchmark and further analyze the contingencies in place, in case the
LIBOR rate referenced in their contracts becomes unavailable for a long
period of time. Most current contracts contain alternative provisions in
the event that LIBOR is unavailable."' In particular, this process
involves acquiring quotes from a set of reference banks that provide
deposit rates for the required currency and maturity.' 52 Wheatley points
out that the current system is flawed in that the magnitude of contracts
that rely on the LIBOR benchmark is great, and the banks referenced in
contracts usually consist of contributing banks. Therefore, in the event
that a LIBOR rate is unavailable, it is quite unlikely that reference banks
will be fully prepared and equipped to provide the rates. The variety of
contingencies in each contract may lead to a calculation of different
interest rates that are to replace the LIBOR benchmark, thus providing
users with a spectrum of interest rates in order to replace one. Wheatley
suggests that industry specialists that provide standardized legal docu-
ments for contracts referencing LIBOR also provide uniform contingen-
cies that may take effect should there be a long-term disruption of
LIBOR.
This is significant in that it represents a safety feature in the event
that the LIBOR rate is again manipulated, unreliable, or becomes
unavailable. It may mean that regulators are seriously considering a pos-
sible replacement of the LIBOR benchmark but are yet unaware of how
the process would take place. On the other hand, this safety contingency
recommendation may simply be representative of a slight fear that
manipulation may again arise in the future and users need to be better
equipped with a detailed procedure in the event that the LIBOR rate is
no longer representative of interbank lending rates.
This question of LIBOR-rate contingencies applicable to existing
150. Abrantes-Metz & Evans, supra note 27.
151. Wheatley, supra note 6, at 39.
152. Id.
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contracts leads to other questions: why has the LIBOR rate become a
globally used rate? Why is it at the center of such a wide variety of
financial contracts? Why is it so widely used in the United States for
mortgages, student loans, and derivative contracts? It may be time for a
benchmark that will be governed in the United States, based on submis-
sions by panel banks that are active in United States' financial markets,
and regulated by United States' officials and regulatory bodies.
VII. CONCLUSION
While Wheatley's recommendations may be a step in the right
direction towards a more credible benchmark, there is still plenty of
work to be done. Although Wheatley suggests that the LIBOR bench-
mark is not broken beyond repair, the better alternative to attempting to
reform a broken LIBOR benchmark is to revolutionize the benchmark
and provide a new one. Financial markets have changed drastically since
LIBOR was first introduced in the 1980s. Accordingly, LIBOR should
be reformed to account for the emergence of global markets in which
greed is a prime motivator.
Providing a better regulatory system will help combat incentives
for manipulation, but the question is for how long. Will market partici-
pants, traders, and banks alike discover a new way to beat the system
and allow greed to take over, and in turn find new ways to manipulate
rates to their advantage? Much of what has already begun to occur and is
to come in the regulation and oversight of the LIBOR setting processes
depends on the selection of an adequate administrator who will develop
codes of conduct and an oversight committee that will effectively moni-
tor discrepancies in submissions.
The introduction of monetary sanctions and criminal prosecutions
may deter individuals from taking unethical actions on a large scale.
However, it is questionable whether this is sufficient to deter an entire
industry from acting together and colluding to evade existing regula-
tions. It is evident that stronger and stricter regulations that possess an
enforcement mechanism are necessary for the financial market.
Although doubtful, if the LIBOR benchmark is to regain its credibility
and usefulness, the only answer is a regulatory structure so tight that
manipulation cannot take place without being noticed and punished
appropriately.
Moreover, requiring banks to base their individual submissions on
actual transaction data, which can then be analyzed by auditing and
oversight committees, may provide a mechanism that makes it tougher
for submitters, traders, and managers to manipulate submissions. How-
ever, allowing adjustments to actual transaction data in preparation for
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rate submission-without requiring per se any underlying data-may
result in a gap in this reform structure, which will allow for
manipulation.
Furthermore, it is questionable how much discretion should be left
to market participants. It is evident that this is a benchmark that was
developed specifically to allow market participants participating in
derivative and swap agreements to rely on a uniform benchmark, rather
than determining an underlying rate for each individual contract. How-
ever, it has been established that those individuals involved in the mar-
ket are not capable of governing themselves without allowing their dark
motivations to take over. Therefore, although market participants should
be a part of any committee formed, they should not be left with a large
amount of discretion.
It is important to find balance: there may be a point where market
participants and contributing panel banks decide that there is too much
regulation and participating in the LEBOR market provides too much
exposure to risks of sanctioning and possible prosecution if the banks'
practices do not strictly comply with the rules and regulations. A system
in which the contributing panel banks are held tightly to their submis-
sions and incentivized to borrow and lend at their submitted rates,
together with more oversight and a structure for verification of submis-
sions, may prove to be a better system, if not a flawless one.
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